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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[83 C.Jd 8;

~

[L. A. No. 2761S.

Cal.Rptr. 17. 403 P.2d 1451

In Bank.

June 23, 1965.]

DANIEL J. SEELY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WHITE
MOTOR COMP A~~, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties.-An award of damages in a
breach of warranty action for lost profits and for money paid
on the purchase price of a truck sold under an express warranty that it was free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service was proper where the
natural tendency of the warranty was to induce buyers to rely
on it and plaintiff did so rely, where the truck bounced violently in use, and where reliance on the warranty and the
warranty itself were manifested by defendant manufacturer's
continued efforts to have the truck repaired, and by defendant's acceptance of the responsibility to correct the bouncing.
(S] Sales-Warranties-Express Warranty.-The statute defining
an express warranty (Civ. Code, § 1732; Com. Code, §§ 2313,
2314) requires only that plaintiff rely on the warranty; it
does not additionally require that plaintiff be aware that the
warranty was made by the manufacturer, instead of the dealer,
to reach the one who in fact made it.
(3] ld.-Buyer's Remedies-Action for Breach of Warranty.-A
warrantor who repeatedly fails to correct a defect as promised
is liable for breach of that promise as a breach of warranty.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Automobiles, § 435.
Kelt. Dig. References: [1, 4, 7, 12-15, 20] Automobiles, § 49; [2]
Sales, §ll6; [3] Sales, §2S3; [5] Sales, §373; [6] Automobiles,
149; Sales, § 255; [S] Appeal and Error, § 196(5); [9, 21, 22]
Products Liability; [10, 17, IS) Products Liability; Sales, § 110;
[11, 19J Sales, § 110; [16J Products Liability; Sales, § 283.
(9)

10

SEELY V. WHITE MOTOR

Co.

[63 C.2d

[4] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties.-Where therc was an express manufacturer's warranty to plaintiff in the purchase
order for a truck sold him by a dealer, no privity of contract
was required in a suit against the manufacturer for breach
of warranty.
[5J Sales - Damages - Breach of Warranty - Loss of Profits.Damages awarded for the loss directly and naturally resulting
in the ordinary course of events from a breach of warranty
(Civ. Code, § 1789, subd. 6; Com. Code, § 2714) can properly
include lost profits, as well as the amount paid on thc purchase
price.
[6] Automobiles-Sales-Warranties: Sales-Buyer's RemediesElection of Remedies.-In an action against a truck manufacturer for consequential damages arising out of a breach of
an express warranty, and not against the immediate seIler for
rescission of the contract of sale, the sales act does not compel
an election of remedies. (cf. Com. Code, § 2608, Comment 1.)
[7] Id.-Sales-Warranties.-In a breach of warranty action
against a truck manufacturer, it could not be said that the
trial court, in estimating that 60 per cent of the lost gross
earnings of plaintiff was lost profits, failed to take rental
value of the truck into account when evaluating the estimates
of profit percentages ranging from 25 to 77 per cent.
[8] Appeal-Reserving Questions-Findings.-One failing to request a finding on a particular issue cannot complain on appeal
that a specific finding was not made. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)
[9] Products Liability-Purpose of Doctrine.-The history of the
doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales
act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern
the distinct problem of physical injuries.
[10] Id.-Suitability of Warranty Theory: Sales-Warranties.Thc unsuitability of the warranty theory to the field of liability for personal injuries caused by a defective manufactured
product does not mean that the warranty theory has no function at all; the law of warranty grew as a branch of the law
of commercial transactions and was primarly aimed at controlling the commercial aspects of these transactions.
[11] Sales-Warranties.-The rules of warranty determine the
quality of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby
determine the quality he must deliver.
[12] Automobiles - Sales - Warranties.-A truck manufacturer
was liable for a retail buyer's loss of profits and for refund of
money paid on a truck, where it warranted the truck to be
"free from defects in material and workmanship under normal
use and service."
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Sales, § 93; Am.Jur., Sales (1st ed § 299).
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[13] Id.-Sales-Warranties.-The parties' practical construction
of the seller's warranty that a truck was free from defects in
material and workmanship under normal use and service during the 11 months that repairs on the truck were attempted,
established that the buyer's use of the truck was a normal use
within the meaning of the warranty.
[14] Id.-Sales--Warranties.-A truck manufacturer's failure to
comply with its obligation to make good at its factory any
defective part of the truck, after ample opportunity to do so,
entitled th~ purchaser from a dealer to recover damages resulting from such breach against the manufacturer.
[15] Id.-Sales--Warranties.-A truck manufacturer was liable
for damages sustained by a truck buyer due to the defective
condition of the truck only because of its agreemcnt to replnce
defective parts, as defined by its continuing practice over 11
months; without an agreement defined by practice 01' otherwise, the manufacturer would not have been liable for commercial losses resulting from the inability to use the truck for
normal purposes.
(16] Products Liability-Distinctions: Sales-Buyer's RemediesAction for Breach of Warranty.-The distinction that the law
draws between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does .not
rest on one plaintiff's having an accident causing physical
injury, but rather on an understanding of the nature of the
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake ill distributing
his products.
[17] Id.-Distinctions: Sales-Warranties.-A manufacturer can
appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by
defects in manufactured products by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that
create unreasonable risks of harm, but cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business, unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands.
(18] Id.-Distinctions: Sales--Warranties.-A consumer should
not be charged, at the will of the manufacturer, with bearing
the risk of' physical injury when he buys a product on the
market; but he can be fairly charged with the risk that the
product will not match his economic expectations, unless the
manufacturer agrees that it will.
[19] Sales--Warranties.-The law of warranty is not limited to
parties in a somewhat equal bargaining position.
[20] Automobiles--Sales-Warranties.-There was no inequality
in the bargaining position of the manufacturer and buyer of a
truck, insofar as the damages recovered by the buyer for his
purchase price and loss of profits arc concerned; the buyer,
whose business was trucking, could have shopped around until
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he found a truck fulfilling his business needs and could be
fairly charged with the risk that the product would not match
his economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed
that it would.
[21] Products Liability-Physical Injury to Property.-Though
the law of warranty governs the economic relation between a
manufacturer and a buyer, the doctrine of strict liability in
tort should be extended to govern physical injury to plaintiff's
property, as well as personal injury.
[22] Id.-Findings.-In a truck buyer's action against the truck
manufacturer, a finding that there was no proof that the defect
in the truck caused the physical damage to it, though ambiguous, was sufficient, absent a request by plaintiff for a
specific finding (Code Civ. Proc., § 634); since the testimony
on causation was in conflict, the trial court's resolution of the
conflict is controlling.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern
County. William L. Bradshaw, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by retailer's customer against manufacturer for
breach of express and implied warranties in the sale of a truck,
for breach of contract and for property damages. Judgment
for plaintiff affirmed.
John M. Nairn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Baker, Palmer & Wall and Oran W. Palmer for Defendant
and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In October 1959 plaintiff entered into
a conditional sales contract with Southern Truck Sales for
the purchase of a truck manufactured by defendant, White
Motor Company. Plaintiff purchased the truck for use in his
business of heavy-duty haUling. Upon taking possession of
the truck, plaintiff found that it bounced violently, an action
known as "galloping." For 11 months after the purchase,
Southern, with' guidance from 'Vhite's representatives, made
many unsuccessful attempts to correct the galloping. On
July 22, 1960, when slowing down for a turn, plaintiff found
that the brakes did not work. The truck overturned, and
plaintiff, who was not personally injured, had the damage repaired for $5,466.09. In September 1960, after paying
$11,659.44 of the purchase price of $22,041.76, plaintiff served
notice that he would make no more payments. Southern
thereafter repossessed the truck and resold it for $13,000.
Plaintiff brought this action against Southern and White
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seeking (1) damages, related to the accident, for the repair
of the truck, and (2) damages, unrelated to the accident, for
the money he had paid on the purchase price and for the
profits lost in his business because he was unable to make
normal use of the truck. During the trial plaintiff dismissed
the action against Southern without prejudice. The court
found that \Vhite breached its warranty to plaintiff and entered judgment for plaintiff for $20,899.84, consisting of
$11,659.44 for payments 011 the purchase price and $9,240.40
for lost profits. It found that plaintiff had not proved that the
galloping caused the accident and therefore denied his claim
for $5,466.09 for the repair of the truck. Both plaintiff and
White appeal from the judgment.
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in awarding damages for lost profits and for the money paid on the
purchase price of the truck. We do not agree with this contention. The award was proper on the basis of a breach of
express warranty.
Defendant included the following promise in the printed
form of the purchase order signed by plaintiff: "The White
Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor vehicle sold
by it to be free from defects in material and workmanship
under normal use and service, its obligation under the war·
ranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or
parts thereof. . . ."
This promise meets the statutory requirement for an express warranty: "Any affirmation of fact
or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." (Civ. Code,
§ 1732 j cf. Com. Code, §§ 2313, 2314.) 1 The natural tendency
of White's promise was to induce buyers to rely on it. and
plaintiff did so rely in purchasing the goods. The reliance
on the warranty, and the warranty itself, are manifested by
plaintiff's continued efforts to have the truck repaired, and
by defendant's acceptance of the responsibility to correct the
galloping. [2] The statute requires only that plaintiff rely
on the warranty. It does not additionally require that he he
aware that it was made by the manufacturer instead of the
dealer to reach the one who in fact made it. Surely if plaintiff sought to have a part replaced that was covered by the
lEfl'eetive January I, 1965, the uniform sales act (Civ. Code, §§ 17211800) was revised, renumbered, and transferred to the Commercial Code.
Citation is given to the comparable sections of both eodes.
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warranty, 'White could not escape its obligation by showing
that plaintiff thought the warranty White made was made by
the dealer.
Defendant contends that its limitation of its obligation to
repair and replacement, and its statement that its warranty
"is expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied," are sufficient to operate as a disclaimer of responsibility in damages for breach of warranty. This contention is
untenable. [3] 'Vhen, as here, the warrantor repeatedly
fails to correct the defect as promised, it is liable for the
breach of that promise as a breach of warranty. (Rose v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal.App.2d 755, 762-763 [28 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 99 A.L.R.2d 1411] ; Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301,
308 [310 P .2d 923].) [4] Since there was an express warranty to plaintiff in the purchase order, no privity of contract
was required. (See Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Ca1.2d
682, 696 [268 P.2d 1041].) Plaintiff also gave reasonable
notice of the defect. (Civ. Code, § 1769; cf. Com. Code,
§ 2607.)
[5] The damages awarded by the trial court, "the loss
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the breach of warranty" (Civ. Code, § 1789, subd.
6; cf. Com. Code, § 2714), can properly include lost profits
(Grupe v. Glick, 26 Ca1.2d 680, 692 [160 P.2d 832]; Mack v.
Hugh W. Comstock Associates, Inc., 225 Cal.App.2d 583, 587
[37 Cal.Rptr. 466]) as well as the amount paid on the purchase price. Defendant contends that plaintiff must elect
between these remedies, relying on an analogy to the sales act
requirement of election between rescission and damages. (Civ.
Code, § 1789.) [6] Since this action, however, is against the
manufacturer for consequential damages and not against the
immediate seller for rescission of the contract of sale, the
sales act does not compel an election of remedies. The often
critic'zed rule of election of remedies (see, e.g., Ezer, The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales 1Varran ties, 8 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 281, 330), has not
bren adopted by the Commercial Code (Com. Code, § 2608,
comment 1), and should not be extended to apply here.
[7] Defendant also contends that the damages awarded are
excessive'since the rental value of the truck was not offset
against plaintiff's claim for lost profits. Plaintiff replies that,
in estimating that 60 per cent of the lost gross earnings was
lost profits, the trial court deducted a reasonable rental value
for the truck. We cannot say that the trial court failed to
take rental value into account when it evaluated the estimates
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of profit percentage that ranged from 25 per cent to 77 per
cent. [8] Since defendant failed to request a finding on the
issue of an appropriate rental value, it cannot complain that
a specific finding was not made. {Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)
It is contended that the foregoing legislative scheme of recovery has been superseded by the doctrine of strict liability
in tort set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Ca1.2d 57, 63 [27 Cul.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897], and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Ca1.2d 256, 261 [37 Cal.Rptr.
896, 391 P.2d 168]. 'We cannot agree with this contention.
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the
economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods.
[9] The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty
provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code
but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
An important early step in the development of the law of
products liability was the recognition of a manufacturer's
liability in negligence to an ultimate consumer without privity
of contract. (Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y.
382, 389 [111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F 696].) About the
same time, the courts began to hold manufacturers liable without negligence for personal injuries. Over a score of theories .
were developed to support liability (see Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore.L.Rev. 119,153-155), and the one
that was generally accepted was borrowed from the law of
sales warranty. (See Prosser, The Assa1£lt Upon the Citadel,
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1126.) "Only by some violent pounding
and twisting," however, could the warranty doctrine be made
to serve this purpose. (Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 Colum.L.Rev. 335, 358;
see also Prosser, supra, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1124-1134.) Final
recognition that "The remedies of injured consumers ought
not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of
sales" (Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323; Greenman
v. Yu,",a Power Products, Inc., 59 Ca1.2d 57, 64 [27 Cal.Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897]) caused this court to abandon the fiction
of warranty in favor of strict liability in tort. (Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, at p. 63; Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Ca1.2d 256, 261 [37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391
P.2d 168].)
[10] The fact that the warranty theory was not suited to
the field of liability for personal injuries. however, does not
mean that it has no function at all. In Gt'unman we recog-
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nized only that •• rules defining and governing warranties that
were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions
cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's
liability to those injured by its defective products unless those
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed." (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59
Ca1.2d 57, 63.) Although the rules governing warranties complicated resolution of the problems of personal injuries, there
is no reason to conclude that they do not meet the "needs of
commercial transactions." The law of warranty •C grew as a
branch of the law of commercial transactions and was primarily aimed at controlling the commercial aspects of these
transactions." (See James, Products LiabiUty, 34 Tax.L.Rev.
192; Llewellyn, On Warronty of Quality, and Society, 36
Colum.L.Rev. 699, 37 Colum.L.Rev. 341.)
Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical injury, they function well in a commercial
setting. (See Com. Code, § 2719; Prosser, supra, 69 Yale L.J.
1099, 1130, 1133.) [11] These rules determine the quality
of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver. In this case, the truck
plaintiff purchased did not function properly in his business.
Plaintiff therefore seeks to recover his commercial losses: lost
profits and the refund of the money he paid on the truck.
[12] White is responsible for these losses only because it
warranted the truck to be C Cfree from defects in material and
workmanship under normal use and service. " [13] The practical construction of this language by both parties during the
11 months that repairs were attempted establishes that plaintiff's use of the truck was a normal use within the meaning
of the warranty. (See Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Ca1.2d 95,
108 [173 P.2d 17].) [14] White's failure to comply with its
obligation to make "good at its factory any part or parts"
of the truck after ample opportunity was given it to do so,
entitles plaintiff to recover damages resulting from such
breach. Had defendant not warranted the truck, but sold it
cc as is," it should not be liable for the failure of the truck to
serve plaintiff's 'business needs.
Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, however, the
manufacturer would be liable even though it did not agree
that the truck would perform as plaintiff wished or expected
it to do. In this case, after plaintiff returned the truck, Southern resold it to Mr. Jack Barefield, an experienced trucker.
Mr. Barefield used the truck cc to pull a 40-foot band" over
state highways. After driving the truck 82,000 miles, he
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testified that he had no unusual difficulty with it. Southern
replaced two tires, added a new fifth wheel, and made minor
alterations to the truck before reselling it to Mr. Barefield, 80
that it is possible that it found a cure for the galloping.
Southern, however, replaced the tires five times, adjusted the
fifth wheel, and made many other changes on the truck during the 11 months plaintiff drove it. 2 Thus, it is more likely
that the truck functioned normally when put to use in Mr.
Barefield's business because his use made demands upon it
different from those made by plaintiff's use. If under these
circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for
business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its
trucks to meet the specific needs of their businesses, even
though those needs were communicated only to the dealer.
Moreover, this liability could not be disclaimed, for one purpose of strict liability in tort is to prevent a manufacturer
from defining the scope of his responsibilty for harm caused by
his products. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal.2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) The manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope. Application of the rules of warranty prevents this
result. {15] Defendant is liable only because of its agreement as defined by its continuing practice .over 11 months.
Without an agreement, defined by practice or otherwise, defendant should not be liable for these commercial losses.
In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 {207
A.2d 305], the plaintiff purchased from a retailer carpeting
that soon began to develop unusual lines. The court held the
manufacturer liable for the difference between the price paid
for the carpet and its actual market value on the basis of
strict liability in tort. We are of the opinion, however, that
it was inappropriate to impose liability on that basis in the
Santor case, for it would result in imposing liability without
regard to what representations of quality the manufacturer
made. It was only because the defendant in tl1at case marketed
the rug as Grade :#1 that the court was justified in holding

•

2The following changes were made on the truck: five sets of front
springs; five drive line changes; alteration of back springs; replacement
of front shock absorbers; fish plating of frame; replacement of clutch
brake; replacement of two clutch release bearings; replacement of pilot
bearing; replacement of two auxiliary transmissions; reinstallation of
neW' front bearings; front end aligned six times; entire tru<,k and trailer
a1imed twice; welded cross member; new cross member installed; replaced tires five times; moved fifth wheel hll<'k and forth.
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that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer not 80
described the rug, but sold it "as is," or sold it disclaiming
any guarantee of quality, there would have been no basis for
recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any
basis for imposing strict liability in tort.
[16] The distinction that the law has drawn hetween tort
recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck"
of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury.
The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the
nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake
in distributing his products. [17] He can appropriately be
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in
terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm.
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products
in the consumer's business unless be agrees that the product
was designed to meet the consumer's demands. [18] A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with
the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for
economic loss alone. (Wyatt v. Oadillac Motor Oar Division,
145 Cal.App.2d 423, 426 [302 P.2d 665], disapproved on other
grounds in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Ca1.2d 21, 31 [27 Cal.Rptr.
689, 377 P.2d 889] ; Trans World Airlines v. Ourtiss-Wright
Oorp., 1 Misc.2d 477 [148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290].) The Restatement of Torts similarly limits strict liability to physical harm
to person or property. (Rest. 2d Torts (Tent. Draft No.
10), § 402 A.)
[19] The law of warranty is not limited to parties in a
somewhat equal bargaining position. Such a limitation is not
supported by the language and history of the sales act and
is unworkable. Moreover, it finds no support in Greenman.
The rationale of that case does not rest on the analysis of
the financial strength or bargaining power of the parties to
the particular action. It rests, rather, on the proposition that
"The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
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doing business. " (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 CaL
2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436] [concurring opinion].) That
rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public
to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can
insure against the possibility that some of his products will
not meet the business needs of some of his customers.
[20] Finally, there was no inequality in bargaining position
insofar' as the damages plaintiff recovered in this case are
concerned. Unlike the defendant in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 11,
White is not seeking to enforce an industry-wide disclaimer of
liability for personal injuries. Here, plaintiff, whose business
is trucking, could have shopped around until he found the
truck that would fulfill his business needs. He could be
fairly charged with the risk that the product would not match
his economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed
that it would. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code expressly recognizes this distinction by providing that limitation of damages is prima facie unconscionable in personal injury eases, but not in cases of commercial loss. (Com. Code,
§ 2719.)
. [21] Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty governs the economic relations between the parties, the .
doctrine of strict liability in tort should be extended to
govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as
personal injury. We agree with this contention. Physical
injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is
. no reason to distinguish them. (See Prosser, supra, 69 Yale
L.J. 1099, 1143; Rest. 2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 10), § 402 A;
cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Ca1.2d 57, 62
[27 CaI.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897].) [22] In this case, however, the trial court found that there was no proof that the
defect caused the physical damage to the truck. The finding
of no. causation, although ambiguous, was sufficient absent
a request by plaintiff for a specific finding. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 634.) Since the testimony on causation was in conflict, the trial court's resolution of the conflict is controlling.
The judgment.is affirmed, each side to bear its own costs on
these appeals.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Peek,; J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J.,
eoncurred.
PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
affirmance of the judgment, but on grounds different from the
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majority. The majority permit recovery on the theory that
there was a breach of an express warranty. Then the majority
say, unnecessarily and gratuitously, that plaintiff cannot recover on the theory of strict liability. Both the holding and
the dicta are, in my opinion, i n c o r r e c t . ' There was no breach of express warranty. It is fundamental that no one is liable for the breach of an express warranty unless the buyer relies upon that warranty (former
Civ. Code, § 1732) or unless the warranty constitutes "part
of the basis of the bargain" (Com. Code, § 2313). Here, the
undisputed facts show that plaintiff did not rely on White
being responsible under the warranty, and it is clear that
White's responsibility was not "part of the basis of the bargain. " The uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that plaintiff had no idea that White was a party to the warranty and
that he relied solely on Southern's responsibility.1 The majority say that the statute requires only that plaintiff rely
on "the warranty," and not that he be aware of who made
it. But one does not rely upon a mere scrap of paper which
calls itself a warranty. He relies on the fact that a certain
responsible party (which he may know as "the manufacturer"
rather than by name) will "stand behind" the product and
perform in accordance with the terms of the warranty. Here
plaintiff admits that he relied on Southern's responsibility
under the warranty, but not on White's.
The majority, having found in favor of the plaintiff on the
theory of an express warranty, completely decided the case.
There was no need to discuss the strict liability doctrine.
Everything said by the majority on that subject is obviously dicta. The problem of what damages may be recovered
in an action based on strict liability is a most important question of first impression in this state. It is too important to
be decided in a mere "advisory opinion." But because' the
majority have elected to discuss it, and have done so, I
submit, erroneously, I cannot allow the erroneous dicta to go
unchallengt!d.
IPlaintiff had read a warranty,provision on a eopy of the eontraet that
was not used. He did not read the warranty provision in the eontraet
that was used, but assumed it was identical to the provision he had read
(which it apparently was). He was asked at trial:
"Q. Well, you understood from the other warranty which you read
that the warranty that was made was made to you by the White Motor
Company, did you nott A. No, I didn't understand that at all.
'.
.
..
.
.
..
.
..
..
.
"You understood from tllnt White Motor Company was the one that
was making the warranty to you, didn't you' A. No, air."
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Given the rationale of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897J, it
cannot properly be held that plaintiff may not recover the
value of his truck and his lost profits on the basis of strict
liability. The nature of the damage sustained by the plaintiff is immaterial, so long as it proximately flowed from the
defect. What is important is not the nature of the damage
but the relative roles played by the parties to the purchase
contract and the nature of their transaction.
Recently in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. (1965)
44 N.J. 52 [207 A.2d 305), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that the strict liability theory California adopted in
Greenman applies to "economic loss" as well as to personal
injury damages. There plaintiff bought carpeting from a local
retailer. When the carpeting became useless because of certain defects, plaintiff sued the manufacturer. In allowing
plaintiff to recover the difference between the price he paid
and the actual market value of the carpeting, the court
expressly disapproved the concept that the strict liability
doctrine should be restricted to personal injury claims.
.. [A]lthough the doctrine has been applied principally in
connection with personal injuries sustained by expected
users from products which are dangerous when defective, ...
the responsibility of the maker should be no different where
damage to the article sold or to other property of the consumer is involved." (207 A.2d at p. 312.) It should be noted
that there, as here, the court was faced with a statutory
scheme covering implied warranties. Unlike the majority
here, however, the New Jersey court expressly refused to
draw an arbitrary distinction between different types of
damage in order to give effect to those statutes in a greater
number of situations.
Of course, the application of the strict liability theory to
property damage (including "economic loss") will limit
the applicability of several sections of the recently enacted
Commercial Code dealing with implied warranties (see, P.g.,
Com. Code~ § § 2607, 2719). But this result, even if unfortunate, follows from the rationale of Greenman, which limitpd
the effect of a statute requiring the purchaser to give dpfendant notice of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time
(former Civ. Code, § 1769). In the present case, it is not
necessary to "extend" Greenman in order to reach the proper
result. All that is required is that we apply its reasoning to

-)
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a factual sitpation which cannot be distinguished analytically
from that case.
In Greenman we allowed recovery for "personal injury"
damages. It is well established that such an award may
include compensation for past loss of time and earnings due
to the injury (Storrs v. Los Angeles Traction 00., 134 Cal.
91,93 [66 P. 72]),.:for loss of future earning capacity (Bonneau v. North Shore R.R. Co., 152 Cal. 406, 414 [93 P. 106,
125 Am.St.Rep. 68]), and for increased living expenses
caused by the injury (Kline v. Santa Barbara etc. Ry. Co.,
150 Cal. 741, 748-749 [90 P. 125]). There is no logical distinction between these losses and the losses suffered by plaintiff here. All involve economic loss, and all proximately
arise out of the purchase of a defective product. I find it
hard to understand how one might, for example, award a
traveling salesman lost earnings if a defect in his car causes
his leg to break in an accident but deny that salesman his
lost earnings if the defect instead disables only his car
before any accident occurs. The losses are exactly the same;
the chains of causation are slightly different, but both are
"proximate." Yet the majority would allow recovery under
strict liability in the first situation but not in the second.
This, I submit, is arbitrary.2
The "history" of products liability law does not compel a
dichotomy between "economic loss" and other types of
damage. Although the various products liability doctrines
developed in the field of personal injury claims, the overwhelming majority of courts today make no distinction between personal injury damages and property damages (including "economic loss") in products liability cases.s If
2Thc majority make another arbitrary distinction when they state that
they would allow recovery in strict liability for the damage eaused to
plaintiff's truck in his accident, if plaintiff had proved that the defect
caused the accident. Unlike the majority, I can attribute no significance
to the fact that these damages sought by plaintiff were not caused by a
collision with an external object in a sudden accident. I cannot rationally
hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an accident caused by
a defective part may recover his property damage under a given theory
while another pl~intiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the
defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other damages proximately caused by an identical defective part. The strict liability rule should apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be
validly distinguished.
3Approaehing our striet liability doctrine, the following cases have held
that I I privity" is not necessary in an action for breach of implied warranty and have applied this rule to allow recovery against a manufacturer
for property damage: Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co. (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1962)
211 F.Supp. SSS; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp. (Mun.Ct.
App.D.C. 1962) IS5 A.2d 919; State Farm Mut. 4uto. Ill" 00. v. 4ftder-
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no such distinction was made under the products liability
doctrines in use before Greenman, then such a distinction
under Greenman's strict liability doctrine may be reasonably (though not necessarily) made only on the basis that
protection of life and limb is of greater social value than
protection against financial loss. But, as money damages
do not replace the life or limb lost, this basis is sound only
to,the extent that allowing recovery for personal injuries
on, ~ strict liability theory operates as a deterrent (vis-a-vis
the· theories formerly used) which induces manufacturers to
be)hore careful in their production methods. But it is highly
doubtful that Greenman's imposition of strict liability does
furnish such a deterrent, in view of the fact that, at the time
Greenman was rendered, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
thE! weakening of the "privity" requirement in implied
warranty actions would have often subjected the manufacturer to liability, ()r at least to litigation, in any event,
whenever a defect in his product caused an injury. (See,
e.g., Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150
P.2d 436}, and Peterson v. Lamb Rubber 00., 54 ·Ca1.2d 339
[5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575].) "A skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who is unmoved by the
prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa loquitur, and
by the e1Iect of any injury whatever upon the reputation
of his goods, will really be stimulated by the relatively slight
increase in possible liability to take additional precautions
against defects which cannot be prevented by only reasonable
care." (Prosser, The Assault upon the Oitadel(1960) 69
Yale L.J. 1099, 1119.)4 The purpose of the strict liability
,OJl·Weber, Inc. (1961) 252 Iowa 1289 [110 N.W.2d 449]; Morrow v.
Caloric Appliance Corp. (Mo. 1963) 372 S.W.2d 41; Pabon v. Hacke'll.,ock Auto Sale., Inc. (1960) 63 N.J.Super. 476 [164 A.2d 773]; 50 New
Walden, Inc. v. Federal In•. Co. (Sup.Ct. 1963) 30 Misc.2d 460 [241
N.Y.S.2d 128]; Jamot v. Ford Motor Co. (Pa. 1959) 191 Pa.Super. 422
[156 A.2d 568]. The following eases have abolished privity in permitting
reeovery for damages involving the loss of (or reduced value of) the pur·
.. hase.1 product itself', whl're no "accident" occurred: Gla/lio/a Biscuit
Co. v. 80uthem ICII Co. (5th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 138; Hoskins v. JOCk801/.
Grai" Co. (Fla. 1953) 63 So.2d 514; Continental Copper 4" 8teel 1ndU8Inc. ~. B. C. "Red" Comeliu., 1f1c. (Fla.App. 1958) 104 So.2d 40.
Nor was privity required in Mazetti v. Armour 4" Co. (1913) 75 Wash.
622 [135 P. 633, Ann.Cas. 1915C 140, 48 L.R.A. N.S. 213], where plaintiff 80ught and reeovered damages for loss of profits and loss of good·
will only.
4See Plant, 8trict Liability of ManufactureT8 for Injuries Call~d
bg Defect, in Product8-.&n Opposi"g View (1957) 24 Tenn.L.Rev. 938,
where it is said (at p. 94:5): I I [W]hat is probably a more powerful ineentive to make products as safe as possible lies in the desire of manu·
facturel'!' 'to avoid the danger that their products will develop a reputa-
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rule as expreSsed in Greenman is not to deter, but" to insure
that the costs of inju,ries resulting from defective. products
. are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are pow~
erless to protect themselves." (Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 57, at p. 63.) The initial
breakthroughs in products liability law may well have operated as deterrents when measured against the former status
of the law, which gave the consumer little protection against
. the manufacturer's carelessness. At that time, a distinction
between personal injuries and other types of damage might
have been justified.. But given the equal treatment of all
types of damage under the law as it existed just before
Greenman, it makes no sense to adopt a new doctrine (strict
liability in tort) for reasons other than deterrence and then
hold that this doctrine is limited by a distinction which can
be justified only if the doctrine were a deterrent. The New
Jersey Supreme Court responded to this historical argument
in Santor, "True, the rule of implied warranty had its gestative stirrings because of the greater appeal of the personal
injury claim. But, once in existence, the field of operation
of the remedy shQuld not be fenced in by such a factor."
(Santor v. A &- M Karagheusian, Inc., supra, 207 A.2d 305,
at p. 309.)
The majority suggest that the manufacturer should bear
(and spread) the risk of personal injury damages because
"the cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured.... "
This is no reason to distinguish between personal injury
damages and other types of damage. Such "overwhelming
misfortune" may not be present in a given personal injury
case, but the majority do not indicate that they would deny
recovery in a personal injury case if this element were lacking. Conversely, an economic loss might be an "overwhelming misfortune" in a given case, but I doubt that any court
tion for being unsafe or defective and therefore be unacceptable to the
purchasing public. Every manufacturing executive with whom the writer
has discussed this matter regards it as a potential commercial disaster
when one of its pr6ducts is found to be defective and the cause of an
injury. The element which is most disturbing to manufacturers is not the
potential judgment of legal liability but the injury which is done to the
reputation of the product and its producer. While it may be conceivable
that the imposition of strict liability could increase in some small measure
the pressure upon a few backward manufacturers to make their product
safe, it is doubtful that it will add very much to existing pressures."
See also Bogert and Fink, BV8ine88 Practice Regarding Warrantie. ill
the Sale of Good. (1930) 25 Ill.L.Rev. 400, 415·416.
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would allow recovery in such a case and deny it in other
economic loss cases. "Overwhelming misfortunes" might
occur more often in personal injury cases than in property
damage or economic loss cases (although the majority cite
no evidence to this effect), but this is no reason to draw the
line between these types of injury when a more sensible line
is available. Suppose, for example, defective house paint is
sold. ·to two home· owners. One suffers temporary illness
from~noxious fumes, while the other's house is destroyed by
rot pecause the paint proved ineffective (a loss generally uninsul.'"ed). Although the latter buyer may clearly suffer the
grea'ter misfortune, the majority would not let him recover
under the strict liability doctrine because hill loss is solely
"ecOnomic," while letting the first buyer recover the minimal
costs and lost earnings caused by his illness.
The majority unduly fear that, if the strict liability rule
is applied to economic loss, "The manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope." This
would not be so if the notion of "defective" in the strict
lial:!ility doctrine is viewed as coextensive with the concept
of "unmerchantable" in the implied warranty field. This
term has been well defined by case law and has been deemed
to be certain enough for use in our recently enacted Commercial Code (see § 2314). Equating "defective" with "unmerchantable" comports with the purpose of Greenman,
which was not to expand the notion of when the manufacturer
has breached his initially implied duty to the purchaser, but
only to eliminate the sales law's restrictions on recovery for
that breach of duty (the privity and notice requirements
and the operation of disclaimers) where the buyer is an
ordinary consumer.
The majority also point to Mr. Barefield's alleged success
with the truck and state that "If under these circumstances
defendant is strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss
suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for business losses
of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet the
specific needs of their businesses, even though those needs were
communicated only to the dealer." Here the majority seem to
equate strict liability and the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose. (See Com. Code, § 2315.)5 No authority
... Where the seller at the ti~e of contracting has reason to know any
tartlcular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
reQ'ing on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
fOOds, there. is .•. an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
neb PUrp~Be:" (See alBO former Civ. Code, t 1735, Bubd. (1).)

'.'
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is cited for this ,proposition,and I have found none. So far as
I know, no p.!9p0nent of the concept of manufacturers' strict
liability has" 'ever seriously argued that the manufacturer
should be liab~e for the product's inability. to serve speciftc
needs which the buyer communicates only to the retailer, except insofar as those needs conformtow}J,at the product is
ordinarily expected (by the manufacturer and the consuming
public) to do. Mr. Barefield's testimony went only to show
that the truck could·.d9 "the jQbs for which it was built"
(Greenman v. Yuba Power. Pro~ucts,Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d
57,64), i.e., that it was merchantable. Apparently he did not
convince the trial court. I fail to see how this testimony tends .
to support the majority's "horrible consequences" argument, .
for there is no indication that the trial court relied on plain-.
tiff's or Barefield's communications of their needs to the dealer
in finding the truck to be "defective,"
The majority recognize that the';l'ules governing warranties
were developed to meet the needs of "commercial transactions." If this is so, then why not look to the transaction between the buyer and the seller and see if it was a "commercial"
transaction rather than a sale to an ordinary consumer at the
end of the marketing chain f How can the nature of the
damages which occur later, long after the transaction has been
completed, control the characterization of the' transaction f .
Any line which determines whether damages should be covered
by warranty law or the strict liability doctrine . shouldbe
drawn at the time the sale is made.
In Greenman, we relied to some degree upon Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69,
75 A.L.R.2d 1J. Henningsen held a manufacturer liable by
holding privity to be unnecessary in an implied warranty action and held that the manufacturer's disclaimer of all warranties was contrary to public policy and therefore void. This
was based upon a realistic appraisal of the "freedom of contract" commonly vested in the consumer in today's economy,
where gross inequality of bargaining power is pervasive.
.. The trad\,tional contract is the result of free bargaining of
parties who are brought together by the play of the market,
and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic
equality. In such a society'there is no danger that freedom
of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole.
But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass
contract has appeared. It is llsed primarily by enterprises
with strong bargaining power and position. 'The weaker party,
in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position
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to shop around for better terms, either because the author of
the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial)
or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are
often understood in a vague way, if at all.' " (Henningsen v,
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra (N.J. 1960) 161 A.2d at p. 86.)
I am not concerned over the fact that if damages on the
strict liability theory are 'allowed here, this may limit the application of some of':the restrictive statutory provisions relating to warranty. In my opinion those restrictive provisions
shouJQ. not apply to the ordinary consumer, who is usually
unable to protect himself from insidious contractual provisions
such' as disclaimers, foisted upon him by commercial enterpris~s whose bargaining power he is seldom able to match,
and who" 'is seldom "steeped in the business practice which
justifies ... " , "the notice requirement (Greenman v. Yuba
Power ProduCts, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 57, at p. 61), and
who should not be barred-by the privity requirement (see fn. 3,
supra). The' purpose of the strict liability rule adopted in
Greenman was to protect people who are" powerless to protect
themselves." (Id. at p. 63.) This does not mean, however, that
the implied warranty sections of the code should not apply
within the world of commerce, where parties generally bargain
on a somewhat equal plane and may be presumed to be familiar
with the legal problems involved when defective goods are
purchased. 6
Although this is a close case, I would find that plaintiff was
an ordinary consumer insofar as the purchase involved here was
aSee Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales (1963) 77 Harv.
L.Rev. 318, 327·328: "A thwarting of the policies behind warranty need
Dot attend recognition of disclaimers in the co:nmercial world. There the
buyer may bc just as able to absorb and administer the inevitable risks
of the seller's operations, Indeed, the seller may be an essential experi·
mental or otherww;s,margillal entrepreneur who would be unable profit·
ably to bear the recurrent costs of strict liability. There is common recourse to insurance. The size of the transactions and the access to technical knowledge make attempts to prove negligence more feasible. Buyers
may even dictate the design, and thus be in a position to prevent the
losses to which they are exposed. They are more eapable of protecting
themselves by caution and testing, and their own manufacturing processes
and quality control systems stand between the object and ultimate users
or bystanders.
'
.. In sales by mass producing and marketing enterprises to individual
Consumers, however, the reasons for recognition of disclaimers are rarely
applicable. When they are, recognition of the disclaimers they support is
1Isually not compatible with realization of the policies behind warranties.
The comparative helplessness of the modern consumer generally eliminates
the p088ibillty of a free and informed choice to assume a risk, of a course
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concerned, even though he '6'ought the truck for use in hi~ busi:r;tess. ~inti.1I was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for
hauling and not. a fleet-owner who bought trucks regulat:ly in
the course of his business;:, He was the final link in the marketing chain, ha.ving no mo're bargaining power than does the dsual individual who purchases a motor vehicle on the retailJevel.
I recognize that this "ordinary consumer" test needs judicial definition,. This should be done on a case-by-case qasis as
is customarily done 'with-any new doctrine. It is, hiever,
the best resolution ofthe.:'dilemma facing this court. I ssume
that the majority do not wish to overrule Greenman. Ii the
other hand, neither the majority nor I wish to extend reenman so as to completely deny any effect. to tlie'disclai~t,:and
notice provisions of the Oommercial Code~ .Thus, a lill Blust
be drawn somewhere. The line drawn by the majority' s'i.arbitrary and artificial, ..th~re being no sound :basis .~<f :~is
tinguishing between ,tp€ tiP~of. d~mage assigned to' op,9,site
sides of the majority li~e: --The'line,l suggest would s~jl to
fit squarely within the r...as1ins for the'strict liability rult. ~
The majority obj~~ to applyj.ngthe strict liability do~ine
to economic loss because they feel that the manufac\Urer
should be able to sell its px:oduct "as is." But this obj~~on
overlooks the f~t. that the strict liability rule would allo~;'the
manufacturer to do. this iIi certain cases. The strict lia£tity
rule, for example, permitS :th~ defense of assumption of
"Here, as elsewhere, the ptrti~'ti.1I will not be heard to comp.lain
of a risk which he has eticountered voluntarily, or broulrht
upon himself with full knowledge and appreciation of the
danger." (Prosser, Torts (3d ed.1964) p. 539.)1

's

nu.

of negotiations which mayb~ ev,idenced in a contract, or of a true bargain. And whenever the cos;"of an inevitable risk is borne by the eonsumer, it cannot be ~stered to those who benefit from it or serve as
an incentive to improvement.? ~_ _ '
..
See also Llewellyn, .0" Wan-anty of QuaZify, and Society (1936) 36
Colum.L.Rev. 6991 712-713, 721;; Prosser, .The ..fssault upon tile Citadel,
supra (1960) 69 Yale L.J. 1099 1133. .
,
~
7Where 80memanufacturerll -:::o~ a given product disclaun,Jiabiliit and
others do not, then a consumer who buys from a disclaiming manufac·
turer, knowing of. the disclaiDl,er, has "assumed the risk," He has a
"reasonable alternative" (ilf.~-at p:'540), buying from a manufacturer
who did not disclaim (and pgrhap8' paying a higher price f9r the maimfncturer to retain these risks). When all manufacturers disclaim, however,
then it can hardly be said th&tC6.~buyer assumes the risk imposed by such
a diselailner when he buys tha. ~:tct. Of course, even if all manufacturers have diselaimers, if the consumer buys a product raising a greater
risk of injury (economic or perilnal) than those of the other manufacturers (perhaps because the product is cheaply mad&. or of an experimental design), knowing of this increased. risk,. then·~the buyer has
assumed the added risk. He could have purchased a 8af~rproduct. Under
, _l
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To sum up, all the strict liability rule does. to implied warranty law is abolish the notice requirement, restrict the effectiveness of disclaimers to situations where it can be reasonably
said that the consumer has freely ~umed the risk, and abolish
the privity requirement, where ordinary consumers are involved. It does not introduce a notion of "defective" which
different from that of"unmerch~nj;able" in implied warranty·
law. These changes ptoperly. adapt:~raditional sales law to the
marketing:p"osition of today's ordinary consumer. Under the
majority dicta, which would· deny plaintiff the price of his
truck as well as his lost profits on a strict liability theory,
the housewife who buys a new refrigerator with such a serious
defect as to make it useless cannot recover for the loss of her
purchase price from the manufacturer (unless there is an
express warranty), because of the privity doctrine (Burr v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 695-696 [268 P.2d 104]).
Should the privity doctrine be abolished,the manufacturer's
disclaimer of implied warranties would bar her, even if she
could not buy a new refrigerator without a similar disclaimer.
Further, if there were no disclaimer, her failure to give the
manufacturer reasonable notice of the defect would bar her
effort to recover. These results cannot be reconciled with the
holding and rationale of Greenman.
Thus, although I would affirm, I would do so on the basis
of the strict liability doctrine.

is

The petition of the defendant and appellant for a rehearing was denied July 21, 1965. Peters, J., was of the opinion
that the petition should be granted .
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tJae faeta involved in this case, of course, we need not be concerned with
~~ problem, for the majority properly found that White's attt'mpt to
11im11D!t ita liability was ineffective, for White failed to perform even ita
lted obligation to plaintiff.
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